

REPORT
OF
THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
OF A
PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION
OF THE
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Made in pursuance of a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of
May last.

DECEMBER 12, 1820.

Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

WASHINGTON:

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1820.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

December 12th, 1820.

SIR: In obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of May last, "directing that the Secretary of War report to this House, at the commencement of the next session, a plan for the reduction of the army to six thousand, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, and preserving such parts of the corps of engineers, as, in his opinion, without regard to that number, it may be for the public interest to retain; and, also, what saving of the public revenue will be produced by such an arrangement of the army as he may propose in conformity with this resolution;" I have the honor to make the following report.

I deem it proper, before a plan is presented in detail for reducing the army, as proposed in the resolution, to state briefly the general principles on which it is conceived our military peace establishment ought to be organized. It will be readily admitted, that the organization of the army ought to have reference to the objects for which it is maintained, and ought to be such as may be best calculated to effect such objects; as it must be obvious, on the slightest reflection, that on considerations connected therewith ought to depend, not only its members, but also the principles on which it ought to be formed.

The necessity of a standing army in peace is not believed to be involved in the subject under consideration, as the resolution presupposes the propriety of maintaining one; and in fact its necessity is so apparent, that, even those least friendly to the army, have never attempted to abolish it, or even to reduce it, since the late war, much below the number proposed in the resolution. The objects for which a standing army in peace ought to be maintained may be comprized under two classes; those which, though they have reference to a state of war, yet are more immediately connected with its duties in peace; and those which relate immediately and solely to war. Under the first class may be enumerated, as the leading objects, the garrisoning of the forts along our Atlantic frontier in order to preserve them, and to cause the sovereignty of the United States to be respected in their immediate neighbourhood, and the occupying of certain commanding posts in our inland frontier to keep in check our savage neighbours, and to protect our newly formed and feeble settlements in that quarter. These are, doubtless, important objects; but are by no means so essential as those which relate immediately and solely to a state of war; and, though not to be neglected wholly, ought not to have any decided influence in the organization of our peace establishment. Without, therefore, making any farther remark on this point of the inquiry, I will proceed to consider the other class, on which, as it

comprises the great and leading inducements to maintain in this country a regular army in peace, the prominent features of its organization ought to depend.

However remote our situation from the great powers of the world, and however pacific our policy, we are, notwithstanding, liable to be involved in war; and, to resist with success its calamities and dangers, a standing army in peace, in the present improved state of the military science, is an indispensable preparation. The opposite opinion cannot be adopted, without putting to hazard the independence and safety of the country. I am aware that the militia is considered, and in many respects justly, as the great national force; but, to render them effective, every experienced officer must acknowledge, that they require the aid of regular troops. Supported by a suitable corps of trained artillerists, and by a small but well disciplined body of infantry, they may be safely relied on to garrison our forts, and to act in the field as light troops. In these services, their zeal, courage, and habit of using fire arms, would be of great importance, and would have their full effect. To rely on them beyond this, to suppose our militia capable of meeting in the open field the regular troops of Europe, would be to resist the most obvious truth, and the whole of our experience as a nation. War is an art, to obtain perfection in which, much time and experience, particularly for the officers, are necessary. It is true, that men of great military genius occasionally appear, who, though without experience, may, when an army is already organized and disciplined, lead it to victory; yet, I know of no instance, under circumstances nearly equal, in which the greatest talents have been able, with irregular and undisciplined troops, to meet with success those that were regularly trained. Genius without much experience may command, but it cannot go much further. It cannot at once organize and discipline an army, and give it that military tone, and habit, which only, in the midst of imminent danger, can enable it to perform the most complex evolutions with precision and promptitude. Those qualities, which essentially distinguish an army from an equal assemblage of untrained individuals, can only be acquired by the instruction of experienced officers. If they, particularly the company and regimental officers, are inexperienced, the army must remain undisciplined, in which case, the genius, and even the experience, of the commander, will be of little avail. The great and leading objects, then, of a military establishment in peace, ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience; so that, at all times, the country may have at its command a body of officers, sufficiently numerous, and well instructed in every branch of duty, both of the line and staff; and the organization of the army ought to be such, as to enable the government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly organized and prepared for actual service. It is thus only, that we can be in the condition to meet the first shocks of hostilities with unyielding firmness; and to press on an enemy, while our resources are yet unexhausted. But if, on the other hand, disregarding

the sound dictates of reason and experience, we should in peace neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skillful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities. Not all the zeal, courage, and patriotism of our militia, unsupported by regularly trained and disciplined troops, can avert them. Without such troops, the two or three first campaigns would be worse than lost. The honor of our arms would be tarnished, and the resources of the country uselessly lavished; for, in proportion to the want of efficiency, and a proper organization, must, in actual service, be our military expenditures. When taught by sad experience, we would be compelled to make redoubled efforts, with exhausted means, to regain those very advantages, which were lost for the want of experience and skill. In addition to the immense expenditure which would then be necessary, exceeding manifold, what would have been sufficient to put our peace establishment on a respectable footing, a crisis would be thus brought on of the most dangerous character. If our liberty should ever be endangered by the military power gaining the ascendancy, it will be from the necessity of making those mighty and irregular efforts to retrieve our affairs, after a series of disasters, caused by the want of adequate military knowledge; just as, in our physical system, a state of the most dangerous excitement and paroxysm follows that of the greatest debility and prostration. To avoid these dangerous consequences, and to prepare the country to meet a state of war, particularly at its commencement, with honor and safety, much must depend on the organization of our military peace establishment, and I have, accordingly, in the plan about to be proposed, for the reduction of the army, directed my attention mainly to that point, believing it to be of the greatest importance.

To give such an organization the leading principles in its formation ought to be, that, at the commencement of hostilities, there should be nothing either to new model or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and the war formation of the army ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the only change in passing from the former to the latter, should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary.

It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder; and the weakness and danger, which otherwise would be inevitable, be avoided. Two consequences result from this principle. First, the organization of the staff in a peace establishment ought to be such, that every branch of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and posts occupied may render necessary; and, secondly, that the organization of the line ought, as far as practicable, to be such that, in passing from the peace to the war formation, the force may be sufficiently augmented, without adding new regiments or battalions; thus raising the war on the basis of the peace establishment, instead of creating a new army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late war. The next principle to be observed, is, that the organization ought to be such as to induce, in time of

peace, citizens of adequate talents and respectability of character to enter and remain in the military service of the country, so that the government may have officers at its command, who, to the requisite experience, would add the public confidence. The correctness of this principle can scarcely be doubted, for, surely, if it is worth having an army at all, it is worth having it well commanded.

These are the general principles upon which I propose to form the organization of the army, as proposed to be reduced under the resolution. By reference to tables A and B, which contain the proposed and present organizations, it will be seen, that the principal difference between them is in the reduction of the rank and file. The present organization of the staff, with its branches, is retained, with slight alterations. The principal changes in it are, in that of the commissary general of purchases, and the judge advocates, by which it is intended that they should conform more exactly to the principles on which the other branches are now formed. It is believed that the true principle of its organization is, that every distinct branch of the staff should terminate in a chief, to be stationed, at least in peace, near the seat of government, and to be made responsible for its condition. It is thus that the government may at all times obtain correct knowledge of the condition of the army in every particular, and be enabled to introduce method, order, and economy, in its disbursements. It is, at present, with slight exceptions, thus organized, and the beneficial effects of it have already been strikingly exemplified by experience. Since the passage of the act of the 14th of April, 1818, which gave the present organization to the staff, the expense of the army has been greatly reduced, while, at the same time, the various articles supplied have been improved in quality, and the punctuality with which they have been issued; and while the movements of the army have, at least for the present, been rendered more expensive by occupying the distant frontier posts at the mouth of the St. Peter's and at the Council Bluffs. By a statement from the adjutant and inspector general, and the books of the second auditor, marked C, containing the army disbursements from 1818 to 1820 inclusive, it appears that the expense of the army in 1818, the year in which the present organization commenced, amounted to three millions seven hundred and forty-eight thousand four hundred and forty-five dollars and one cent, while the amount of warrants issued for current disbursements to the first of November this year, has amounted only to two millions six hundred and sixteen thousand five hundred and twenty-six dollars and eleven cents, and the disbursements of the whole year will, probably, not exceed two millions seven hundred thousand dollars. In the year 1818, the aggregate average number of the military establishment, including the cadets, amounted to eight thousand one hundred and ninety-nine, and that of this year to nine thousand six hundred and eleven. It is admitted, that, during the same period, a considerable reduction has taken place in many of the articles which constitute the supplies of the army, the effect of which has been to reduce its expense; but, on examination, it will appear

that the diminution on this account is much less than what on the first impression might be supposed. Many of the more considerable items, which constitute the expenses of the army, are fixed by law, and do not fluctuate with the change of prices, such as the pay of the officers and men, the subsistence of the former, and the allowance to them for servants, forage, transportation of baggage, &c. All of the items estimated for, by the paymaster general, excepting clothing for servants, which is of small amount, partake of this character; to which, if we add those in the quartermaster general's estimates, which, although the price of some of them have in the period under consideration been reduced, yet that has been at least balanced in the increased expenditure of that department for the two last years, by the extension and increased number of the military posts; it will result, that the reduction in the expense of the army by the diminution of prices is substantially confined to the clothing, medical, and subsistence departments. Some pains have been taken to ascertain this diminution, in the various articles supplied by them, and it has resulted in the belief, that the average of those supplied by the clothing and medical departments were, in the year 1818, about seven per cent. higher than in this, and in the subsistence about forty per cent. With this data, it is ascertained, (see table D,) that the expense of the army this year, had no diminution in price since 1818 taken place, would have amounted, deducting for the difference of the average number of the two years, and allowing for the expenditure of the Seminole war in 1818, to about two millions seven hundred and ninety-one thousand and thirty-eight dollars and fifty-five cents. This sum, deducted from three millions seven hundred and forty-eight thousand four hundred and forty-five dollars and one cent, the expense of the army in 1818, gives for the actual saving, after allowing for the diminution of prices, the sum of nine hundred and fifty-seven thousand three hundred and fifty-six dollars and forty-six cents, (see table D,) which has been effected through the organization of the present staff, by enabling the department to superintend, in its minute details, as well the various disbursements of the army, as the measures taken to prevent the waste of public property. The amount of saving may appear to be very great, but it is confidently believed, that it cannot be materially reduced by any just mode of calculation of which the subject is susceptible.

As great as this result is, it is only in war that the benefits of a proper organization of the staff can be fully realized. With a complete organization, and experienced officers, trained in time of peace to an exact and punctual discharge of their duty, the saving in war (not to insist on an increased energy and success in our military movements) would be of incalculable advantage to the country. The number of deputies and assistants in each branch ought to be regulated by the exigency of the service, and this must obviously depend much more on the number of posts, than on the number of troops; and as no material change can, consistently with the public interest, be made as to the posts, under the proposed reduction, little diminu-

tion can be made in the number of subordinate officers belonging to the staff.

It is also proposed to retain the two major and four brigadier generals. Although it is not probable that there will be concentrated, in time of peace, at any one point, a force equal to the command of a single major, or even a brigadier general, yet it is conceived that it is important to the service that they should be retained. As two regiments, with a proper proportion of artillery and light troops, constitute, in our service, one brigade, and two brigades a division, the command of a major general, the number of regiments and battalions, under the proposed organization, thus gives a command equal to that of two major and four brigadier generals. But a more weighty, and, in my opinion, decisive reason, why they should be retained, may be found in the principle already stated, that, the organization of the peace establishment ought to be such as to induce persons of talent and respectability to enter and continue in the military service. To give to the officers of the army the necessary skill and acquirements, the military academy is an invaluable part of our establishment; but that alone will be inadequate. For this purpose, respectability of rank and compensation must be given to the officers of the army, in due proportion to the other pursuits of life. Every prudent individual, in selecting his course of life, must be governed, making some allowance for natural disposition, essentially by the reward which attends the various pursuits open to him. Under our free institutions, every one is left free to make his selection; and most of the pursuits of life, followed with industry and skill, lead to opulence and respectability. The profession of arms, in the well established state of things which exist among us, has no reward but what is attached to it by law; and if that should be inferior to other professions, it would be idle to suppose individuals, possessed of the necessary talents and character, would be induced to enter it. A mere sense of duty ought not, and cannot, be safely relied on. It supposes that individuals would be actuated by a stronger sense of duty towards the government, than the latter towards them.

If we may judge from experience, it would seem that the army, even with these important commands, which, from their rank and compensation, must operate strongly on those who have a military inclination, does not present inducements to remain in it, stronger than, nor even as strong as, those of most of the other respectable pursuits of life.

The number of resignations has been very great, of which many are among the most valuable officers. Should the number of generals be reduced, the motive for entering or continuing in service must also be greatly reduced; for, like the high prizes in a lottery, though they can be obtained by a few only, yet they operate on all those who adventure; so those important stations which they occupy are, with those the best qualified to serve their country, the principal motive to enter or remain in the army. To retain them is, in fact, the cheapest mode of commanding such talents; for, to pursue the meta-

phor, if the high prizes were distributed among all of the tickets, there would be but few adventurers, so, if the compensation attached to the general officers were distributed proportionably among the other officers, the inducement which the army now holds out for a military profession, to individuals of suitable character, would be almost wholly lost. If the generals were reduced to one major, and two brigadiers, the saving would not exceed \$14,432 annually, which, distributed among the officers in proportion to their pay, would give to a lieutenant but \$25 59 additional pay, and to a captain \$30 87 annually, a sum too inconsiderable to have much effect.

I will proceed next to make a few remarks on that portion of the organization which proposes to reduce the rank and file, without a correspondent reduction of the battalions and regiments. By a reference to the table A, it will be seen that it is proposed to add the rifle regiment to those of the infantry, and unite the ordnance, and the light and heavy artillery into one corps of artillery, which, when thus blended, to form nine regiments of infantry, and five battalions of artillery, from the latter of which the corps of ordnance is to be taken, to consist of one colonel, and lieut. colonel, two majors, seven captains, and as many lieutenants as the President may judge necessary. This organization will require all the officers of the line of the present army to be retained. The reasons for the union of the corps, as well as the other details, will be found explained in the proper place in the annexed tables.

No position connected with the organization of the peace establishment is susceptible of being more rigidly proved, than that the proportion of its officers to the rank and file ought to be greater than in a war establishment. It results immediately from a position, the truth of which cannot be fairly doubted, and which I have attempted to illustrate in the preliminary remarks, that the leading object of a regular army in time of peace ought to be, to enable the country to meet with honor and safety, particularly at the commencement of war, the dangers incident to that state; to effect this object, as far as practicable, the peace organization ought, as has been shown, to be such, that, in passing to a state of war, there should be nothing either to new model, or to create; and that the difference between that, and the war organization ought to be simply in the greater magnitude of the latter. The application of this principle has governed in that portion of the formation of the proposed military establishment, now under consideration. The companies, both of the artillery and infantry, are proposed to be reduced to their minimum peace formation, the former to consist of sixty four privates, and non commissioned officers, and the latter of thirty seven, which will give to the aggregate of both corps thus formed six thousand three hundred and sixteen, non commissioned officers, musicians and privates. Without adding an additional officer, or a single company, they may be augmented, should a just precaution, growing out of our foreign relations, render it necessary, to eleven thousand five hundred and fifty eight; and, pending hostilities, by adding 288

officers, the two corps, on the maximum of the war formation, may be raised to the respectable force of 4,545 of the artillery, and 14,490 of the infantry, making in the aggregate 19,035 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates (see table E.) The war organization, thus raised on the basis of the peace establishment, will bring into effective operation the whole of the experience and skill of the latter, which, with attention, would, in a short period, be communicated to the new recruits, and the officers recently appointed, so as to constitute a well disciplined force. Should the organization of full companies, on the contrary, be adopted for the peace establishment, this process could be carried to a very limited extent. Six thousand men so organized can be augmented on the full war establishment only to 9,115 by doubling the battalions. (see table E.) Any additional force, beyond that, must be obtained by adding new regiments and battalions, with all of the disadvantages of inexperience in the officers and men, without the means of immediate instruction. This was the fatal error at the commencement of the late war, which cost the country so much treasure and blood. The peace establishment, which preceded it, was very imperfectly organized, and did not admit of the necessary augmentation; nor did the government avail itself of even its limited capacity in that respect. The forces raised were organized into new corps, in which, consequently, every branch of military duty was to be learned by the officers as well as men. But, with all of these disadvantages, the experience and discipline of the old establishment was of immense use, and has not been duly appreciated. The officers belonging to it gradually diffused their military knowledge through the army, and contributed much to the brilliant results of the campaign of 1814. For the truth of this assertion, I might with confidence appeal to those officers, who then acquired so much glory for themselves and their country.

Another reason remains to be urged, why, in the peace establishment, the number of officers ought to be great compared with the actual force. At the commencement of war an adequate number of experienced officers is of greater importance than that of disciplined troops, even were it possible to have the latter without the former; for it is not difficult to form in a short time well disciplined troops by experienced officers, but the reverse is impossible. The qualifications of the officers are essentially superior to those of the soldiers, and are more difficult to be acquired. The progress of military science has not added much to the difficulty of performing the duty of the soldier, or of training him, but it has greatly to that of the officer. No government can, in the present improved state of the military science, neglect with impunity to instruct a sufficient number of its citizens in a science indispensable to its independence and safety, and to perfect which instruction, it is necessary that some portion of them (the number to be regulated by the resources of the country and its relation with other governments) should make arms their profession.

Table F exhibits the estimate of the saving which will be made by the proposed organization.

I have thus presented an organization which I deem the most effective, and which, in the future exigencies of the country, may be of the utmost importance. A different one, requiring for the present an expenditure something less than that proposed, might, in some respects, be more agreeable at this moment; but, believing that nothing in our situation or in our relation with other powers, however pacific at this time, can give a certain assurance of uninterrupted peace, a state which may exist in the imagination of the poet, but which no nation has yet had the good fortune to enjoy, I have deemed it my duty to present that organization which will most effectually protect the country against the calamities and dangers of any future contest in which it may be our misfortune to be involved.

Economy is certainly a very high political virtue, intimately connected with the power and the public virtue of the community. In military operations, which, under the best management, are so expensive, it is of the utmost importance; but, by no propriety of language can that arrangement be called economical, which, in order that our military establishment in peace should be rather less expensive, would, regardless of the purposes for which it ought to be maintained, render it unfit to meet the dangers incident to a state of war.

With a single observation, which was omitted in its proper place, I will conclude my remarks. The plan proposed for the reduction of the army gives six thousand three hundred and sixteen non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, instead of six thousand, the number fixed in the resolution. It was found difficult to form an organization on proper principles, which would give that precise number, and as the difference was not deemed very material, I have ventured to deviate to that extent from the terms of the resolution.

I have the honor to be,

Your most obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

The Honorable JOHN W. TAYLOR,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

A.

ORGANIZATION of the Army as proposed under the Resolution of the House of Representatives of 11th May, 1820.

GENERAL STAFF.

- 2 Major generals.
- 4 Aids de camp.
- 4 Brigadier generals.
- 4 Aids de camp.
- 1 Judge advocate.
- 6 Topographical engineers.
- 4 Assistant topographical do.
- 1 Adjutant and inspector general.
- 2 Adjutants general.
- 4 Assistant adjutants general.
- 2 Inspectors general.
- 4 Assistant inspectors general.
- 10 Regimental adjutants.
- 8 Battalion adjutants.

Quartermaster's Department.

- 1 Quartermaster general.
- 2 Deputy quartermasters general.
- 16 Assistant deputy quartermasters general.
- 10 Regimental quartermasters.
- 8 Battalion quartermasters.

Paymaster Department.

- 1 Paymaster general.
- 19 Paymasters.

Purchasing Department.

- 1 Commissary general.
- 1 Assistant commissary general.
- 2 Store keepers.

Subsistence Department.

- 1 Commissary general, with as many assistant commissaries as the service may require.

Medical Department.

- 1 Surgeon general.
- 2 Assistant surgeons general.
- 1 Apothecary general.
- 2 Assistant Apothecaries general.
- 25 Surgeons.
- 44 Assistant surgeons.

Engineer Corps.

- 1 Colonel.
- 1 Assistant engineer.
- 1 Lieutenant colonel.
- 2 Majors.
- 6 Captains.
- 6 Lieutenants.
- 6 Second lieutenants.

Military Academy.

- 12 Professors and masters.
- 250 Cadets.

ARTILLERY.

- 1 Colonel commandant.
- 1 Colonel of ordnance.
- 1 Lieutenant colonel of ordnance.
- 2 Majors of ordnance.
- 5 Lieutenant colonels of regiments.
- 5 Majors do
- 7 Captains of ordnance.
- 5 Do of light artillery.
- 40 Do of artillery.
- 10 Lieutenants of light artillery.
- 80 Do of artillery.
- 10 Second lieutenants of light artillery.
- 80 Second lieutenants of artillery.

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- 247 Officers.

15	Sergeants of light artillery.
120	Do of artillery.
30	Corporals of light artillery.
240	Do of artillery.
5	Do of the train.
5	Armorers.
5	Smiths, (light artillery.)
5	Trumpets, (light artillery.)
40	Drummers.
90	Gunners, (light artillery.)
720	Do artillery.
180	Matross, light artillery.
1,440	Do artillery.
10	Workmen.
45	Soldiers of the train, light artillery.
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2,950	Privates.
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INFANTRY.

9	Colonels.
9	Lieutenant colonels.
9	Majors.
90	Captains.
90	Lieutenants.
90	First lieutenants.
90	Second lieutenants.
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297	Officers.
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360	Sergeants.
360	Corporals.
9	Armorers.
9	Drum majors.
90	Drummers.
2,520	Privates.
18	Workmen.
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3,366	Privates.
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75	Artificers, workmen of ordnance.
6,391	Men, rank and file.
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STAFF.

The chief reduction which is practicable in the staff, is that of the purchasing department. It is reduced to one commissary general, stationed at Washington; one assistant and two storekeepers, at New York and Philadelphia, where all stores purchased for the army will be concentrated, and from whence they will be distributed to the quartermasters of every corps. By abolishing the distinction between the battalion and regimental paymasters, several corps may occasionally, when assembled on one point, be paid by the same officer. The difficulty of finding suitable persons willing to accept of the appointment of surgeons' mates, has likewise been the reason for suppressing that rank, and allowing in their steads a certain number of assistant surgeons with the rank and appointment of post surgeons, and abolishing all distinctions of rank and pay between surgeons employed in a post, battalion, or regiment. In small posts the assistant commissaries of subsistence may be charged with the functions of quartermasters.

ARTILLERY.

By uniting the three corps of the ordnance, light artillery, and artillery, in one, appointing one general staff at the head of it, and making its officers pass in rotation through the three services, the organization of the army will be rendered more simple, and the instruction of the officers much more complete. The present regiment of light artillery being organized to manœuvre sixty guns, is stronger than our occasions require; being on foot, and performing garrison duty, it cannot practise its peculiar manœuvres, nor qualify itself for the service which it will be called upon to perform in the field. It is therefore proposed to convert it into an additional regiment of foot artillery, which will only be changing its denomination, and to add a company of light artillery to each of the five regiments of artillery. This arm will thus be distributed on the frontier, and by allowing twenty-eight saddle and thirty-two train horses to each company, with ten soldiers of the train to serve them, it will be enabled to manœuvre two pieces at a time, with their caissons.

Two lieutenants and two second lieutenants in each company are more than the service indispensably requires. A certain number of officers of this rank can, therefore, always be spared from regimental service, and appointed as assistants in the ordnance department. But it is necessary to maintain some supernumerary captains for this purpose, for, if their number did not pass that of the companies of artillery, it would be impossible to spare a captain of artillery from his company. Lest misapprehension should arise on this subject, it is proper to state, that officers of artillery detailed on the ordnance service, are exclusively under the control of the ordnance department. The service of the arsenals is to be provided for out of the artillery; and the cannoneers will thus perfect themselves in the composition of fire-

works, &c. A single company of ordnance artificers will be retained in peace.

As three or four experienced pointers are sufficient for each piece, it is proposed to form them into a peculiar class, as in Europe. All augmentations or reductions of the artillery will then fall on the matrosses, who can be trained in a few weeks. The proposed organization allows three sergeants, commanding two guns, to each company, (of whom the senior may perform the duties of orderly and quartermaster sergeant,) six corporals, commanding each one gun, three gunners, and six matrosses, (the least number that can manœuvre it,) to each gun. By raising the force of each company to 100 men, in time of war, the whole corps will be able to manœuvre 90 guns in the field, viz. 30 by the light artillery, and 60 by ten companies of foot, and 900 or even 1,800 guns in forts and batteries, by allowing six cannoncers, or even three, with the aid of the militia, to serve alternately two guns.

INFANTRY.

The proposed organization in the reduction of each regiment to the minimum force, will leave it adapted to the purposes of military service and instruction, by preserving in each corps all its necessary component parts. To execute the modern manœuvres of the field, each battalion must divide itself in two half battalions, four divisions, eight platoons, and sixteen sections, and thirty-two squads, exclusive of its flank companies. Experience has pointed out that in time of war its front should not pass 200 files, exclusive of flank companies, lest it become weak and wavering. But it cannot in peace be reduced below 128 files, or 64 to a half battalion, 32 to a division, 16 to a platoon, 8 to a section, 4 to a squad, as the various fractions would become too diminutive for any service, if reduced below that number.

The propriety of reducing each regiment to its minimum force, rather than reducing the number of regiments, and making them somewhat stronger, has been chiefly deduced from the following principle: the desire of avoiding to create new regiments, with raw inexperienced officers at their head, in the time of war. Each regiment of the army can be formed into two battalions, equally intermixed with old soldiers at the approach of war, and that by a very simple operation, provided that, some time previously, care may have been taken to augment the number of their officers, and fill up their ranks to a higher complement. Nine regiments which, on the proposed organization, form only 3,663 men in time of peace, may then be raised to near 16,000 in time of war, without creating new corps—by doubling the number of battalions, and raising their front to 250 files, including the flank companies, and forming them in 3 ranks. It is, therefore, evident, that the reduction of each regiment of infantry, when formed on this small scale, whilst it makes a very trifling economy, for the present, deprives us of the power of forming a large and effective force in time of war.

The mode of doubling the battalion is simply to form a battalion of each half battalion, a division of each platoon, a platoon of each section, &c. and fill up their ranks to the proper number, with a care to place the recruits in the second ranks.

NOTE.—As this estimate is predicated on the smallest numbers that can perform the requisite manœuvres in the school of company and battalion, and, as experience proves that no organization can be kept full, an increase of one-sixth to the rank and file, would render the corps at all times efficient and perfect, and would greatly improve the proposed organization.

Dr.

GENERAL STATEMENT of the Bank of the United States and its Offices of Discount and Deposit, at the dates specified herein.

Cr.

DATE.			Bills discounted on personal security.	Bills dis- counted on funded debt.	Bills discount- ed on bank stock, &c.	Domestic Bills of Exchange.	Treasurer of the United States.	Overdrafts.	Debt of S. Smith and Bu- chanan, Geo. Williams, and J. W. M ^c Cul- loch.	Due from Bank United States and Offices.	Due from State Banks.	Interest & commission on loan fr. Baring & co & co.	Real Estate, permanent Expenses, and Bonus.	Expenses.	Deficien- cies.	Notes on hand of Bank U. S. and Offices.	Notes of other Banks.	Specie.	Capital Stock.	Notes issued.	Dividends unclaimed.	Discount, Exchange, & Interest.	Profit & loss and contin- gent interest.	Due to Bank U. States and branches.	Due to State Banks.	Loan from Baring & Co. and Hope & Co.	Damages on foreign bills.	Bills received of S. Smith & Buchanan.	Deposites on account of Treasurer U. States.	Deposites on account of public officers	Deposites on account of individuals.	
1820.		\$9,157,604 15 278,008 00 52,659 65 189,941 20 63,200 00																														
October 30	Bank United States	Funded debt of the U. States, various, at Bank U. S.	1,816,480 50	30,550 00	3,737,095 00	9,356 39	-	-	-	14,484,289 97	779,130 15	8,200 00	1,068,456 84	13,702 81	-	1,589,554 64	105,859 34	994,990 15	26,026,958 63	1,909,155 04	11,959 10	191,848 45	2,668,244 30	-	1,371 36	324,690 46	2,040,000	26,048 59	37,355 55	117,419 95	248,540 41	775,466 95
23	Office Portsmouth	do.	280,277 29	5,100 00	7,360 00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,089 45	-	178,225 00	19,827 60	349,046 72	200,000 00	295,900 00	-	7,901 71	-	-	154,189 17	-	-	-	-	33,255 58	30,379 50	19,300 10
26	Boston	do.	539,139 6	22,900 00	74,400 00	71,088 97	-	-	-	693,497 00	63,365 44	-	-	4,275 37	-	442,730 00	-	286,221 99	750,000 00	506,145 00	185 50	20,477 06	-	-	15,546 74	477,774 96	-	-	-	133,325 76	140,888 62	153,274 74
26	Providence	do.	233,100 17	-	4,000 00	93,531 17	-	-	-	27,432 73	17,346 73	-	-	1,559 01	-	237,100 00	8,331 07	29,927 23	300,000 00	261,430 00	-	8,251 91	-	-	276 91	20,586 37	-	-	-	26,170 84	6,813 10	28,798 98
23	Middletown	do.	285,899 87	-	7,585 00	12,212 00	-	-	-	12,386 04	9,709 33	-	-	1,348 88	-	175,310 00	13,902 00	42,309 57	200,000 00	287,080 00	-	7,604 57	-	-	31,155 08	1,805 89	-	-	-	12,724 00	5,715 99	14,577 16
25	New York	do.	1,186,204 45	-	-	24,826 74	-	-	-	523,122 40	657,538 94	-	-	7,113 22	-	695,200 00	130,141 98	594,829 43	1,500,000 00	866,970 00	595 00	33,069 53	-	-	368,990 45	134,850 37	-	-	-	217,467 60	282,862 47	414,171 74
23	Baltimore	do.	2,725,777 25	-	1,850,279 63	144,232 37	-	199,547 00	1,540,000 00	98,227 54	112,756 12	-	93,900 20	7,517 07	85,428 83	217,440 00	46,091 81	763,150 23	-	911,915 00	6,012 70	82,445 35	-	-	6,105,760 99	114,801 86	-	-	-	38,966 47	129,753 54	494,682 14
21	Washington	do.	1,233,569 42	500 00	121,216 24	21,403 16	241,886 78	-	-	140,099 19	29,694 15	-	18,086 17	1,053 75	-	155,265 00	52,998 18	153,685 31	500,000 00	1,257,625 00	57 00	25,147 03	-	-	67,143 58	20,516 17	-	-	-	172,475 59	126,492 98	-
25	Richmond	do.	1,377,675 58	-	56,010 00	3,900 71	-	-	-	2,010 12	27,015 77	-	34,103 25	4,896 88	100,566 41	821,560 00	7,699 00	148,508 38	1,000,000 00	982,390 00	231 50	28,037 65	-	-	399,699 35	35 85	-	-	-	15,662 15	48,243 87	109,645 73
21	Norfolk	do.	705,680 45	500 00	121,545 50	-	4,260 57	-	-	152,425 90	35,891 45	-	25,093 79	4,880 88	-	87,290 00	15,557 68	113,481 11	500,000 00	364,480 00	-	12,616 38	-	-	120,686 19	5,761 30	-	-	-	128,432 86	134,630 60	-
24	Fayetteville	do.	556,518 16	-	46,805 00	2,795 50	-	-	-	12,116 93	81,435 53	-	3,880 00	2,743 72	24,450 00	123,540 00	35,893 64	36,240 12	500,000 00	163,020 00	562 50	15,692 54	-	-	181,397 03	565 46	-	-	-	26,385 53	13,665 95	10,129 59
17	Charleston	do.	1,407,880 75	18,200 00	764,731 75	34,510 00	-	-	-	1,546 59	26,670 00	-	67,609 06	15,205 95	-	286,940 00	159,571 00	1,084,865 74	1,500,000 00	667,520 00	1,992 50	60,730 79	-	-	849,856 75	10,191 64	-	-	-	90,753 39	76,172 99	610,312 78
17	Savannah	do.	1,157,054 30	-	29,860 00	55,896 08	-	-	-	36,587 92	75,724 03	-	662,770 00	5,304 18	-	193,987 00	294,033 14	-	1,000,000 00	1,001,060 00	306 20	25,251 39	-	-	295,695 60	1,609 77	-	-	-	44,534 23	58,191 57	112,562 49
13	Lexington	do.	1,180,871 68	-	20,273 00	28,974 81	-	-	-	52,817 44	41,838 20	-	-	4,015 56	-	30,810 00	29,537 00	110,922 05	-	132,000 00	-	20,572 91	-	-	1,286,176 52	-	-	-	-	1,610 71	10,240 80	49,458 80
10	Louisville	do.	1,018,265 70	-	-	83,138 99	-	-	-	12,999 93	51,727 08	-	-	1,595 32	-	70,835 00	60,939 28	280,307 18	-	357,390 00	177 80	22,518 79	-	-	1,047,785 10	34,751 79	-	-	-	63,044 12	-	54,140 88
14	Chillicothe	do.	412,523 44	-	-	15,950 00	-	-	-	27,281 20	-	-	-	2,219 34	100,000 00	91,272 55	2,049 00	78,749 35	-	192,640 00	-	7,106 99	-	-	470,152 72	4,773 39	-	-	-	15,506 05	19,477 78	20,387 95
Sept. 30	Cincinnati	do.	1,712,333 63	-	500 00	270,433 94	-	-	-	26,163 92	538,228 98	-	-	1,831 01	-	27,340 00	38,953 50	140,763 99	-	473,960 00	-	29,072 28	-	-	2,141,696 08	-	-	-	-	50,183 93	-	61,656 68
30	New Orleans	do.	1,477,099 17	-	24,157 50	199,457 03	-	-	-	118,282 32	77,925 09	-	40,000 00	6,169 83	-	314,970 00	33,020 00	623,941 70	1,000,000 00	846,490 00	-	32,589 36	-	-	62,465 68	23,189 73	-	-	-	248,195 13	133,119 54	568,973 20
October 26	Pittsburgh	do.	671,469 89	-	-	11,400 00	41,351 85	-	-	8,900 52	-	-	14,123 13	3,176 71	-	87,840 00	1,540 00	35,525 86	-	139,210 00	-	14,789 23	-	-	683,085 51	-	-	-	-	2,839 17	35,404 05	-
			\$19,977,821 31	77,750 00	6,865,818 62	1,083,097 86	287,499 20	199,547 00	1,540,000 00	16,430,187 66	2,625,996 99	8,200 00	1,393,247 04	89,718 94	310,445 24	6,295,992 19	955,899 08	6,051,499 25	34,976,958 63	11,621,380 04	22,079 80	645,723 92	2,668,244 30	14,283,150 81	1,175,905 01	2,040,000	26,048 59	37,355 55	1,135,205 44	1,507,813 75	3,794,267 54	

Dr.

RECAPITULATION.

Cr.

The total amount of specie on hand, by the statements, is	6,051,499 25
To which should be added—	
Remittance from New York of foreign gold sent to the Mint, the precise value not being ascertained, the Mint is not charged, say	336,000 00
Remittance from this Bank to New York to cover the above, not received at the date of the last statement from that office,	335,000 00
	\$6,722,499 25

Funded debt of the United States, various,	-	9,157,604 15
Louisiana 54 per cent.	-	278,008 00
Bills discounted, viz:		
On personal security,	19,977,821 31	
Do and funded debt,	77,750 00	
Do and Bank stock, &c.	6,865,818 62	
Bills of exchange, viz:		26,921,389 93
Foreign,	52,659 65	
Domestic,	1,083,097 86	
Baring, Brothers, & Co.	-	1,135,757 51
Hope, & Co. Amsterdam,	-	189,941 20
Overdrafts,	-	63,200 00
Debt of S. Smith and Buchanan, George Williams and J. W. McCulloch,	-	199,547 00
Due from offices of Discount and Deposit,	-	1,540,000 00
State Banks,	-	16,430,187 66
Interest and commission on loan from Baring & Co. and Hope & Co.	-	2,625,996 99
Real estate, permanent expenses, and bonus,	-	8,200 00
Expenses,	-	1,393,247 04
Deficiencies,	-	89,718 94
Cash, viz: Notes of Bank of the United States and Branches,	6,295,992 19	
Other Banks,	955,899 08	
Specie,	6,051,499 25	
		13,303,390 52
	Dollars	73,646,634 18

Capital stock,	-	34,976,958 63
Bank and Branch notes,	-	11,621,380 04
Dividends unclaimed,	-	22,079 80
Discount, exchange, and interest,	-	645,723 92
Profit and loss and contingent interest,	-	2,668,244 30
Due to Bank of the United States and offices,	14,283,150 81	
State Banks,	1,175,905 01	
		15,459,055 82
Loan from Baring & Co. and Hope & Co.	-	2,040,000 00
Damages on Sterling bills protested,	-	26,048 59
Bills of exchange received of S. Smith & Co.	-	37,355 55
Deposites, viz:		
On account of Treasurer of the United States,	1,135,205 44	
Deduct overdrafts,	287,499 20	
		847,706 24
On account of public officers,	1,507,813 75	
Individuals,	3,794,267 54	
		6,149,787 53
	Dollars	73,646,634 18

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, November, 1820.

JAMES HOUSTON Assistant Cashier

C.

ABSTRACT from the Annual General returns of the Army, shewing the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, in each year, as reported by the latest returns received at this office; together with the academic staff, and cadets of the military school, at West Point.

2-21	RETURNS.	Commissioned Officers.	Non-commissioned officers, musicians, & privates.	Army Aggregate.	Staff of the military academy not of the army.	Cadets of the military academy.	Grand Total.
	December, 1817 - -	640	7,581	8,221	8	253	8,482
	December, 1818 - -	644	7,032	7,676	9	231	7,916
	December, 1819 - -	641	8,047	8,688	9	244	8,941
	September, 1820 - -	683	8,469				
	As the returns of this year are only rendered for the third quarter, I have to add the recruits of the several rendezvous, and an estimate for those which will be enlisted during the fourth quarter - -		885	10,037	8	236	10,281

NOTE.—A division of the aggregates at the close of 1817, and 1818, will give the average strength of the army, for 1818, 8,199, and, in like manner, the average strength of the army for 1820 will be 9,611.

C.—Continued.

Abstract of the recruiting returns, showing the number of men enlisted in each of the following years, viz:

1817	3,939
1818	4,238
1819	4,304
1820	3,211

The number of recruits for this year is taken from the returns of the three first quarters, and an estimate for the present quarter.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, 2d December, 1820.

D. PARKER, Adj. & Inspec. Gen.

[21]

Statement of the annual expenses of the army proper, consisting of the following appropriations, viz: pay, subsistence, forage, clothing, bounties and premiums, expenses of recruiting, hospital department, contingencies, quartermaster's department, and military academy, (building excepted,) during the years 1818, 1819, and to the 30th November, 1820, inclusive.

For the year 1818	\$3,748,445	01
1819	\$3,351,363	12
1820	\$2,616,526	11

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Second Auditor's Office, 5th Dec. 1820.

WM. LEE.

F.

Statement showing the saving of expenditure by the proposed organization of the army.

Pay for officers and men, subsistence for officers, forage for officers, and clothing for officers' servants	} 419,702 70
Subsistence department, - - - - -	194,595 76
Quartermaster's department, - - - - -	100,000
Clothing department, - - - - -	153,650
Bounties, premiums, and recruiting, - - - - -	25,296
Medical department, - - - - -	11,960

Total am't of saving by the proposed organization \$905,204 46

NOTE—The estimate of saving is made on the basis of the expenditure of 1820, and on the supposition of the rank and file of the army, under the existing organization and that which is proposed, not being full by one sixth. Should a reduction be made, as proposed, the actual appropriations of the next year, under the various heads, must be determined by the principles which have governed in forming the general estimates for that year, and may differ in some respects from the saving above calculated. As the ranks would be nearly full in the first year after the reduction, some allowance would have to be made on that account.